The Naval Review The copyright of this article rests with the author, or the author's estate.

1966 AND ALL THAT.

THE kind of ships which will comprise our future Navy is a subject of absorbing interest. Much has already been written on this subject in previous numbers of THE NAVAL REVIEW. And in my opinion the more we discuss it the better, in particular the intriguing if somewhat squalid squabble which has been going on over the relative merits of the battleship and the large aircraft carrier. .First of all, I propose to ignore the argument that aircraft will one day replace ships altogether. I do not dispute it, and I shall advise my grandchildren to try the Air Force as a career; but I am confident that such a state of affairs will not come about in my life-time. In this paper I shall be content to put forward my ideas for the more immediate future.

I think it is safe to assume that, so long as we depend largely upon merchant shipping for our commerce and supplies, our need of destroyers and escort vessels will be as great as ever. Of course, if some extremely intelligent gentleman should discover a means whereby aircraft can detect submarines submerged at any depth, then they, the aircraft ­would probably form a more economical escort, but equally probably not such an efficient one. No, the one essential answer to the submarine is small, well-armed warships, the faster the better.Next let us turn to cruisers. There have already been more than enough indications during this war, save for the Exeter's gallant fight at the River Plate, to show that the heavy cruiser's star has set. It was never a bright one. But the light cruiser, which is comparatively cheap and easy to build, has many useful functions: general trade protec­tion in peacetime; convoy escort in waters not menaced by more powerful units; covering the main body of the fleet from attacks by enemy light forces; showing the flag. And she should remain a sound component of the fleet.

I am certainly not qualified to discuss the future of submarines, but it seems clear that their life is becoming daily more hazardous. That our own still manage to enjoy substantial success in spite of enemy counter-measures and a lack of targets only fills me with greater admiration for their crews and does not convince me of their future. My own guess is that, if the present progress and development of counter-measures are maintained, the submarine, must also undergo revolutionary development or decline into obsolescence.

Now I come to what is intended to be the meat of the pudding-my "two-cents worth" on the battleship and carrier controversy. I am careful not to say battleship versus carrier, because to my mind they must remain complementary for many years to come. Depending on circumstances, each has functions which it can peform (sic) more efficiently and/or economically than the other. A very brief study of naval operations in the present war brings to light the significant part which their geographical positions have played. In the vast distances of the Pacific the battleship is virtually lost. (I speak figuratively and not necessarily literally!) Unless the opposing fleets both desire a general capital ship action - an extremely unlikely contingency - the admiral who is so inclined would find it practically impossible to get his battleships within range, Evasion, granted reasonable enemy intelligence on both sides, would be much too simple. But with the far greater range afforded by carrier-based aircraft there should be opportunities from time to time of inflicting decisive damage on the enemy before he can regain the .safety of his base. This long-range sea warfare can naturally work equally well for the defending fleet, as was proved at the Battles of Midway and the Coral Sea. I will go so far as to say that in the coming all-out Pacific war the sole primary function of battleships will be coastal bombardment. At all other times they will in effect form the aircraft carrier's heavy screen. Japanese sea power will be broken by the Anglo-American Naval Air Arm, assisted to a greater or less extent, again dependent on geographical limitations, by shore-based aircraft.

In more confined waters, such as the Mediterranean and the North Sea, the battleship stands a better chance of coming into her own: True, the enemy is never so far from his base, but if aircraft, either shore or carrier-based, can find and fix him, the battleship can still arrive in time to finish the job (Matapan). However, this eventuality is scarcely sufficient justification for the battleship in itself, particularly as aerial projectiles become more powerful; for the aircraft would be perfectly capable of the complete destruction of the enemy themselves, .Thus it would appear that the battleship has been ousted as the primary offensive power of the fleet; indeed it is doubtful whether her OFFENSIVE capabilities can any longer be exploited. What then can continue to justify the existence of the capital ship as we know it to-day? I suggest it has two uses, both of them important - one of them vitally so. The first - coastal bombardment - I have already mentioned. Her big guns are still more effective than bombers on account of their greater accuracy and concentration. (The greatest triumph in this respect in the present war so far must be their intervention at Salerno.) The second, and far more important, their ability to defend merchant ships against heavy enemy units in conditions where carrier-borne aircraft are unable to operate. Now I know that these aircraft have operated successfully in heavy weather, and that, conversely, the accuracy of gunfire declines under such conditions. But having had a little recent experience of dirty weather flying I am prepared to back the gun, especially at night. I cite as an instance the successful defence of an Arctic convoy during which the Scharnhorst was destroyed. The account of the action spoke of high wind and heavy sea, and this, together with the few hours of daylight, almost certainly accounts fot the fact that aircraft took no part. And I feel sure that the time required to develop carrier ­borne aircraft for operating in any conditions must be measured in decades and not in years.

It is also, I think, open to question whether fleet (or large) carriers will be required very much longer. The range of shore-based aircraft is increasing rapidly, and they will no doubt be able to reach any part of the ocean from strategic bases in a comparatively few years' time. Yet, as their range increases so must their size, with a consequent loss of manoeuvrability. And manoeuvrability is the one essential qualification for torpedo ­bomber attacks

The inferences which I draw are these:

1. Should the torpedo remain the primary weapon for anti-shipping strikes, the fleet carrier will continue to hold a predominant place in the fleet, but is likely to be confined to the wider oceans.

2. If the long-range heavy bomber is found to be a more effective weapon than the lighter torpedo-bomber we shall shortly see the eclipse of the large carrier.

3. For, following on (2) above; the single-seat fighter, now accepted as a vital protective component of a modern fleet, will become the sole remaining carrier-borne aircraft. And fighters are equally effectively and, in the event of sinkings, more economically borne in a smaller carrier.

To sum up. The fleet carrier is at present, and will remain at least in the immediate future, the primary offensive unit of the fleet. Her well-earned prestige should be rewarded by granting her the status of "Capital Ship." But future construction should tend to decrease her size and correspondingly increase the number of these vessels.

Our present battleships should be retained in commission after the war, but it must be recognized that their general function is now defensive in. character. When acting, as convoy escort they must remain in its company. Covering forces are all very well, but they cannot always arrive in time. Further construction of these ships should be on a very limited scale.

The heavy cruisers should be broken up or converted suitably for training purposes. All light cruisers must be kept in commission, and a steady programme of construction maintained.

A big building programme of destroyers and escort vessels will be necessary, and all but the oldest ships kept in regular commission. If normal fleet.. requirements are insufficient to employ so many small ships, what better opportunity could there be for large-scale and constant training of our Reservists?

As for submarines, I think priority should be given to research. Some drastic development, in particular an enormous increase in underwater speed, is essential if they are not to be overwhelmed by the progress of counter-measures.

The creation and maintenance of such a fleet will of course involve tremendous expenditure. But the nation will be prepared to pay; for, with the lessons of this war in their minds, our people must surely this time appreciate that fundamental truth -

SI VIS PACEM PARA BELLUM.

HANGOVER